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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the Court err in accepting, approving, and 
enforcing the parties1 Stipulation as a settlement agreement 
dispositive of all pending issues? 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce action in which Mrs. Brown, the 
plaintiff-appellant (hereinafter "appellant") appeals the Order 
entered by the Court below, which approved and enforced the 
parties' Stipulation and modified their prior Decree of Divorce 
in conformity with the terms of the Stipulation. 
2. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDING 
The parties were divorced on January 7, 1980 (R. at 16) 
and shortly thereafter, on February 21, 1980, the Court below 
entered its Amended Decree of Divorce (R. at 19). Appellant 
subsequently filed her Petition for Modification of Decree of 
Divorce on March 1, 1983 (R. at 29), to which Mr. Brown, the 
defendant-respondent (hereinafter "respondent"), counter-
petitioned. (R. at 37) Thereafter extensive discovery was 
undertaken and completed. (R. at 238, 241; T. at 3, 6) The 
matter was set for trial on August 14, 1984. (R. at 148) 
Proposals for settlement were exchanged. (R. at 238, 241, 
250-251; T. at 3, 6, 15-16) Prior to the trial, on June 5, 1984, 
an agreement was reached and the parties and their attorneys 
appeared at a proceeding before a court reporter and recorded 
their Stipulation, setting forth the terms of their settlement 
agreement and disposing of aLl pending issues. As a result, the 
trial date was stricken. (R. at 150, 238-239; T. at 3-4) 
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Respondent thereafter reduced the recorded Stipulation 
to writing and sent it to the appellant!s counsel for execution, 
(R. at 239; T. at 4) After some delay and assurances from 
appellant's counsel that the written Stipulation would be 
executed and returned, appellant's counsel instead filed his 
Withdrawal on November 7, 1984, (R. at 151, 239; T. at 4) 
Appellant's new counsel then entered his Appearance and 
informally requested further discovery (R. at 155, 240; T. at 5), 
whereupon respondent filed his Motion For Order Approving and 
Enforcing Settlement Agreement as stipulated by the parties 
before the court reporter on June 5, 1984. (R. at 160) 
3. DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
Upon hearing, and after taking the matter under 
advisement, the Court below granted respondent's Motion For Order 
Approving and Enforcing Settlement Agreement; accepted and 
approved the parties' Stipulation, and entered its Order 
modifying the parties' Decree of Divorce in conformity with their 
Stipulation (R, at 191), 
4. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 21, 1980, the Honorable Christine M. 
Durham, then Judge of the District Court in Salt Lake County, 
entered an uncontested Amended Decree of Divorce based upon the 
Stipulation of the parties. (R. at 19) This Amended Decree 
of Divorce provides in pertinent part that: 
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a. Appellant is awarded custody of the parties1 three 
minor children (R. at 19); 
b. Respondent is awarded visitation rights with the 
parties1 minor children, basically consisting of alternating 
weekends from Friday evening until Saturday evening, alternating 
holidays, and one or two weeks each summer if appellants, 
respondents, and the children's schedules can accommodate such. 
(R. at 19-20); and 
c. Appellant is awarded $300 per month per child, for 
a total of $900 per month as child support* (R. at 20-21) 
The month immediately prior to the time the parties' 
Amended Decree of Divorce was entered, the respondent grossed 
approximately $7,500 that month in wages. At years end his gross 
wages were approximately $81,500. (R. at 77-78) The parties' 
youngest child in appellants' custody was not school age (R. at 
250; T. at 15) and the appellant relied solely on respondent for 
her support. (R. at 125; T. at 5) 
Three years after entry of the parties1 Amended Decree 
of Divorce, the appellant filed her Petition For Modification of 
Decree of Divorce on March 1, 1983, seeking in pertinent part an 
increase in alimony from $900 per month to $1500 per month, an 
increase in child support from $300 per month per child to $500 
per month per child; respondent's assumption of the children's 
orthodontal expenses, and attorney's fees. (R. at 29-32) 
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Respondent counter-petitioned seeking an expansion of his 
visitation rights and a termination of his alimony obligation. 
(R. at 37-43) 
During the course of more than a year, extensive 
discovery was conducted and completed by both parties. (R. at 
238, 241; T. at 3, 6) Upon conclusion of discovery, it was clear 
that respondent had, since the time of the parties' Amended 
Decree of Divorce, remarried and had another child. (R. at 75) 
Further, his monthly living expenses had increased substantially 
(R. at 69-75) yet his gross monthly wage at this time was 
approximately $7,150, though with a projected year-end gross wage 
of $98,500. (R. at 76-77) The appellant on the other hand, who 
is still in her thirties, is a college graduate who once 
qualified for teaching and has a real estate license, (R. at 250; 
T. at 15) yet she had contacted no employment agencies and made 
no application with Utah Job Service in the past year (R. at 
124-125) and continues to rely on respondent as her support 
despite the fact that the parties1 minor children are now school 
age (R. at 23, 250; T. at 15) and no other activities would 
interfere with her gainful employment. (R. at 125) Against 
these facts the trial date of August 14, 1984 approached. 
Respondent had scheduled appellant's deposition for 
June 5, 1984, and the parties exchanged proposals for settlement. 
(R. at 238, 250-251; T. at 15-16) Appellant's counsel proposed a 
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future termination of alimony and sent a copy of that proposal to 
the respondent. (R. at 250-251; T. at 15-16; Addendum A-l) 
Respondent's counsel replied by letter of May 30, 1984, offering 
his final proposal for settlement, (R. at 251; T. at 16; 
Addendum A-5) The day prior to appellant's scheduled deposition 
her attorney informed respondent's attorney that the issues were 
settled, and proposed that the deposition time be used in recording 
the parties' agreement which would thereafter to reduced to written 
form. (R. at 238; T. at 3) 
At the time of the scheduled deposition on June 5, 1984, 
appellant discussed the agreement with her attorney. (R. at 242; 
T. at 7) The parties and their attorneys then appeared before a 
court reporter, and the comprehensive settlement agreement was 
set forth in detail as the parties' Stipulation. The Stipulation 
begins by acknowledging that the parties have reached a 
settlement, and immediately thereafter clearly states the 
provisions relating to alimony and child support. (Addendum A-6) 
As counsel for the respondent recited the Stipulation, appellant's 
counsel interjected, as did the respondent. The appellant, 
however, made no objections, expressed no reservations, and said 
nothing during the entire proceeding. (R. at 242-243, 244; T. at 
7-8, 9) The Stipulation took effect in July, 1984. 
Following the proceeding which recorded the parties 
Stipulation, counsel for the respondent reduced this agreement 
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to a writing which it is acknowledged accurately reflects the 
parties1 Stipulation and sent it to appellant's counsel for 
signing. The scheduled trial date was stricken, and starting in 
July the respondent met his increased financial obligations to 
the appellant under the terms of the Stipulation and appellant 
accepted the benefits without reservation. (R. at 239, 245, 247; 
T. at 4, 10, 12) The parties conducted summer visitation based 
upon the Stipulation. (R. at 240; T. at 5) Appellant expressed 
no objection to the terms of the Stipulation. (R. at 240, 251-252; 
T. at 5, 16-17) Although there was some delay in respondent's 
receipt back of the written Stipulation previously sent to 
appellant's attorney, respondent's attorney was assured by 
appellant's attorney that the written Stipulation would be 
executed and returned. Instead, after over five months of 
respondent meeting his increased financial obligations under the 
terms of the Stipulation and the loss of a trial date and tax 
benefits to the respondent, appellant's attorney filed his 
Withdrawal and appellant for the first time expressed to respondent 
through inference by her new attorney that she did not consider the 
Stipulation to be binding upon her. (R. at 239-240, 245; T. at 4-5, 
10) Respondent thereafter filed his Motion For Order Approving and 
Enforcing Settlement Agreement as stipulated by the parties before 
a court reporter on June 5, 1984. (R. at 160) Upon hearing by the 
Court below, respondent's Motion was granted, the parties' 
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Stipulation was accepted and approved by the Court, and the parties1 
Decree of Divorce was modified by its Order conforming with the 
June 5th Stipulation and providing in pertinent part that: 
a. Appellant's alimony is reduced from $900 per 
month to $500 per month commencing with July, 1984, and 
continuing for a period of two years; 
b. Respondents child support obligation is increased 
from $300 per month to $500 per month for each of the parties' 
three children for a total of $1,500 per month; 
c. Respondent's visitation rights with the parties 
minor children are detailed and expanded; 
d. Respondent is to pay all past and future 
orthodontal expenses of the parties1 minor children; and 
e. Respondent is to pay appellant's attorney's fees 
of $1,500. (R. at 191-198) Although appellant chose to resist 
enforcement of the parties' Stipulation at hearing on 
respondent's Motion, she has never moved to vacate her 
Stipulation. 
SUMMARY OF ARGDMENT 
Although appellant is dissatisfied with the rulings of 
the Court below, that Court was in an advantageous position to 
receive and weigh the evidence presented, and to become 
acquainted with the parties' problems and the totality of the 
circumstances relating to the issues. Despite the subjective 
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dissatisfaction of one party to a divorce action, unless there is 
a clear showing of misapplication of the law or abuse of 
discretion, then the carefully considered ruling of the trial 
court should not be disturbed. Eastman v. Eastman, 558 P.2d 514 
(Utah 1976). 
In the present case, appellant has failed to show a 
misapplication of the law or clear abuse of discretion by the 
Court below. Although the Klein case, supra, holds that a party 
is entitled to relief from a stipulation upon his timely 
repudiation if there is any jurisdiction for relief in law or 
equity, those cases cited by appellant in her brief where relief 
from a stipulation was granted are clearly distinguishable from 
the present case. Stipulations of settlement are generally 
recognized as contracts requiring a higher degree of 
justification for relief than that necessary to avoid an ordinary 
stipulation. Kershaw v. Pierce Cattle Co., 393 P.2d 31 (Idaho 
1964); United Factors v. T.C. Associates Inc., 21 Utah 2d 351, 
445 P.2d 766, (1968). The issue of whether appellant understood 
and agreed to the terms of the stipulation is one of fact, 
clearly within the Court's discretion to determine. Klein, 
supra; Baird v. Baird, 6 Wash. App. 587, 494 P.2d 1387 (1972). 
Although appellant asserts she did not understand or agree to the 
stipulation, the trial court was presented with firm evidence to 
the contrary, the weight of which supports its findings that all 
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issues were considered and the agreement was made with the 
consent of all parties. 
It is also within the discretion of the trial 
court to determine whether appellants application for relief 
from the stipulation was timely made. United Factors, supra; 
Johnson v. People's Finance and Thrift Co., 2 Utah 2d 246, 272 
P.2d 171 (1954). Here, appellant has never made formal 
application for relief from her stipulation, though after several 
months she did oppose enforcement. The evidence clearly shows that 
any objection she made was more than five months from the date of 
the stipulation and after both parties had conducted themselves in 
accordance with the stipulation to appellantfs benefit and 
respondents substantial financial detriment. Certainly there 
was no clear abuse of discretion by the trial court in estopping 
appellant from denying the agreement in as much as her objection 
was untimely in view of the circumstances. 
Nor do the total facts and circumstances in this case 
clearly indicate that the resulting Order modifying the parties1 
divorce decree, as based upon the stipulation, is inequitable. 
In divorce actions, where the trial court may exercise considerable 
discretion in adjusting the parties' rights and obligations, a 
stipulation is not necessarily binding on the court and it may 
consider not only the stipulation but the totality of facts and 
circumstances of the case in fashioning an equitable decree. 
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Klein, supra. Here, where respondent's income has increased 
together with his financial obligations, but where the evidence 
shows appellant clearly has the education, skills, and ability 
to contribute towards her support, the parties' stipulation and 
the resulting Court Order is not inequitable. 
Appellant has not met her burden of showing clear abuse 
of discretion or misapplication of the law to such a degree that 
the Order is manifestly unfair and inequitable. The Order of the 
lower Court should be affirmed in its entirety. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE CONSIDERED AWARDS AND ORDERS OF THE TRIAL 
COURT ARE PRESUMED PROPER AND SHOULD NOT BE MODIFIED ABSENT A 
CLEAR SHOWING BY APPELLANT THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION, OR WAS MISTAKEN AS TO THE APPLICABLE LAW. 
It is clear from appellant's brief that she is 
extremely dissatisfied with Judge Sawaya's Order approving and 
enforcing the parties' Stipulation, and modifying the parties' 
Decree of Divorce in conformity with that Stipulation. The fact 
that one of the parties to a divorce proceeding is dissatisfied 
with the rulings of the trial court, however, is neither 
indicative of the propriety and merits of those rulings nor 
unusual in the course of the inherently emotional and 
psychologically traumatic process of divorce and subsequent 
proceedings. 
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Clearly a stipulation between the parties to a divorce 
action does not divest the trial court of his authority to 
fashion a just and equitable decree nor abrogate his duty to do 
so. That court retains the authority, despite a stipulation of 
the parties, to consider the total facts and circumstances of the 
case in adjusting the rights and obligations of the parties to 
effect a fair outcome of the proceedings. As noted in Klein v. 
Klein, 544 P.2d 472 (Utah 1975): 
It is the established rule that a stipulation 
pertaining to matters of divorce, custody, and 
property rights therein, though advisory upon 
the court and would usually be followed unless 
the court thought it unfair or unreasonable, is 
not necessarily binding on the court anyway. 
It is only a recommendation to be adhered to 
if the court believed it to be fair and 
reasonable...there is no reason that the trial 
court cannot consider what was proposed by the 
parties as a stipulation, and what was said by 
their counsel about it, as part of the total 
facts and circumstances upon which to fashion 
what in his judgment is a just and equitable 
decree. 544 P.2d at 476 (footnote citation 
omitted). 
Once such judgment of the trial court is exercised, and as this 
Court has held on innumerable occasions, the ruling of the trial 
judge in divorce actions of an equitable nature is favored with a 
presumption of propriety and accuracy. It is only in those few 
instances in which the appellant can clearly demonstrate a 
manifest abuse of discretion or misapplication of law such that 
the orders of the trial court are inequitable in relation to the 
circumstances of the case that the considered judgment of the 
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trial judge will be disturbed. Such a position is logically 
grounded upon the advantaged position of the trial court, which 
has received evidence presented on the issues and become 
acquainted with the parties1 problems and the totality of 
circumstances relating to the issues. As observed in Eastman v. 
Eastman, 558 P.2d 514 (Utah 1976): 
We have many times stated that even though 
divorce cases are equitable, on which this 
Court may review the evidence, due to the 
advantaged position of the trial court, we 
give considerable deference to his findings 
and do not disturb them unless the evidence 
clearly preponderates to the contrary, or 
he has abused his discretion or misapplied 
principles of law. 558 P.2d at 516 
(footnote citation omitted.) 
It is therefore incumbent upon appellant to demonstrate 
some clear abuse of discretion or misapplication of law before 
this Court will act to revise any aspect of the judgment entered 
below. 
In view of the considerable discretion accorded to the 
trial judge and this Court's requirement that a clear abuse of 
discretion or misapplication of law be demonstrated as a 
condition precedent to any substitution of the trial judge's 
ruling, the burden is upon the party dissatisfied with the trial 
court's decision to demonstrate such error. One of the many 
cases so holding is English v. English, 565 P. 2d 409 (Utah 
1977), in which the Court concisely summarized this rule: 
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The trial court, in a divorce action, has 
considerable latitude of discretion in 
adjusting financial and property interests, 
A party appealing therefrom has the burden 
to prove there was a misunderstanding or 
misapplication of law resulting in substantial 
and prejudicial error; or that the evidence 
clearly preponderates against the findings; 
or that such a serious inequity has resulted 
as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion, 
565 P.2d at 410 (footnote citation omitted,) 
Essentially identical statements of this principle are found in 
numerous other Utah cases. See Barker v. Barker, 551 P.2d 1263 
(Utah 1976); Hansen v. Hansen, 537 P.2d 491 (Utah 1975); and 
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1974), Similarly, in 
the divorce decree modification case of Christensen v. 
Christensen, 628 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1981), this Court again 
summarized the applicable standard of review: 
On review this Court will accord 
substantial deference to the judgment of 
the trial court due to its advantaged 
position and will not disturb the action 
of that court unless the evidence clearly 
preponderates to the contrary, or the 
trial court abused its discretion or 
misapplied principles of law... 628 P.2d 
at 1299 (footnote citation omitted.) 
Under the standard of review traditionally applied by 
this Court, the judgment of the Court below is presumed valid and 
will not be disturbed unless appellant has demonstrated that the 
trial judge has misapplied the relevant law to such a degree that 
the Order is manifestly unfair and inequitable or has so clearly 
abused his discretion as to result in substantial prejudice. 
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POINT II. APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MEET HER BORDEN OF 
DEMONSTRATING MISAPPLICATION OF LAW OR CLEAR ABOSE OF DISCRETION; 
THEREFORE THE JODGMENT BELOW SHOOLD BE AFFIRMED IN ITS ENTIRETY. 
Although appellant's brief makes clear her subjective 
dissatisfaction with the judgment entered by Judge Sawaya, she 
fails to show a misapplication of law such that would make the 
judgment of the Court below manifestly unfair and inequitable or 
an abuse of discretion resulting in substantial prejudice. 
As this Court has held, if there is any justification 
in law or equity for avoiding or repudiating a stipulation, and 
he timely does so, he is entitled to be relieved from it, otherwise 
not. Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472 (Utah 1975) The justification 
necessary for relief upon timely repudiation of a stipulation 
which disposes of all issues in settlement of pending litigation 
as here, however, must clearly be of a high degree. Stipulations 
for settlement of litigation are regarded with favor by the 
courts and are generally accorded recognition as a contract. 
Kershaw v. Pierce Cattle Co., 393 P.2d 31 (Idaho 1964). As this 
Court noted in United Factors v. T.C. Associates, Inc., 21 Utah 
2d 351, 445 P.2d 766 (1968): 
In the case of a stipulation for settlement, 
the general rule is that it is to be 
regarded as removed from the sphere of 
ordinary stipulations, particularly procedural 
ones, which the court is free to set aside or 
not, in its broad discretion and for the sake 
of convenience alone, and although there is 
some authority that it may be set aside upon 
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a proper showing if no material change in the 
position of the parties has occurred, the rule 
is usually stated to require, for granting 
relief, a showing equivalent to that 
necessary to set aside a contract in equity, 
(445 P.2d at 768, footnote citation omitted.) 
This court found the settlement stipulation there to be a binding 
contract and denied relief when there was a unilateral mistake of 
fact upon which the stipulation was based. So also did the court 
in the divorce case of Baird v. Baird, 6 Wash. App. 587, 494 P.2d 
1387, (1972) which held that a judgment based upon the parties1 
stipulation for settlement will not be upset absent a showing of 
fraud, mistake, misunderstanding, or lack of jurisdiction. 
Those cases granting a party relief from a stipulation, 
and as cited by appellant in her brief in support of her position 
that she has good cause and should be accorded such relief, are 
clearly distinguishable from the facts of the present case. In 
Call v. Marler, 403 P.2d 588 (Idaho 1965) there was no 
stipulation for settlement. The court there held that the 
parties1 subsequent stipulation at trial contradicted their prior 
stipulation and to that extent abrogated it. The court in First of 
Denver Mortgage Investors v. Zundel, 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979) 
disregarded a stipulation involving a point of law requiring 
judicial determination to enforce the rights of parties to the 
action who were not parties to the stipulation. Nor did the 
stipulation there purport to settle all issues. In Harsh 
Building Company v. Bialac, 529 P.2d 1185 (Ariz. 1975) the court 
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affirmed relief from a stipulation settling all issues but only 
upon a finding of special circumstances changing the conditions 
upon which the stipulation was based and a determination that the 
stipulation was entered into under duress of directed verdict 
sufficient to negate contractual intent. Where the stipulation 
was contrary to the cityfs statutory duty and was construed by 
the city contrary to the intent of the parties, the court in 
Runyan v. City of Neosho Rapids, 585 P.2d 1069 (Kan. 1978) upheld 
relief from the stipulation to the extent that it did not conform 
with the parties1 intent and the understanding of the lower 
court. In Thompson v. Turner, 558 P.2d 1071 (Idaho 1977) the 
stipulation related to procedure only, and the court there 
affirmed relief in the interest of judicial economy. 
The Stipulation of the parties in the present case is a 
complete settlement of all issues. It is not one involving 
contradictory agreements on certain issues, points of law 
necessary for judicial determination, changed circumstances or 
mere procedure. No fraud or lack of jurisdiction is alleged. 
Here, the appellant claims she was "ambushed," that she never 
came close to settlement and did not understand the Stipulation 
nor agree with it. The record discloses, however, that appellant 
was privy to settlement negotiations between counsel. Her then 
attorney sent her a copy of her proposal for settlement offering 
a termination of alimony in three years and a child support 
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increase to a sum closely approximating the terms of the 
Stipulation. (Addendum A-lj R. at 250-251; T. at 15-16) 
Respondent's attorney countered with his final proposal for 
settlement accepting most of appellant's proposal but seeking 
some concessions relating to alimony, child support, and summer 
visitation. (Addendum A-5; R. at 251; T. at 16). It was 
uncontroverted at hearing that copies of these letters were in 
appellant's possession prior to the Stipulation. Appellant 
admits discussing proposals and counter-proposals for settlement 
with her attorney prior to the Stipulation (R. at 241; T. at 6) 
She most probably knew that she risked a termination of her 
alimony if the matter went to trial, in view of discovery 
indicating her level of education, job skills, and lack of 
involvement in any activities apart from the care of her school-
age children. (R. at 124-125, 250; T. at 15) Clearly she was a 
party to the negotiations for settlement. If, as appellant 
contends, she had no knowledge that her deposition would be used 
to record the parties' Stipulation and that she did not 
understand or agree to the Stipulation, the evidence is clearly 
contrary. Prior to recording the Stipulation she discussed the 
terms with her then attorney and was told that the purpose of the 
meeting was to agree to those terms on the record. Her attorney 
strongly advised settlement on those terms and expressed his 
assessment and opinion that she would not fare better on the 
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issues at trial. Although appellant may have been disappointed 
with her attorney's assessment, she chose to follow his advise 
and proceeded before a court reporter to have the agreement 
recorded in her presence and with her attorney as the parties1 
Stipulation. (R. at 179-180, 242; T. at 7; Addendum A-2) 
Clearly at this point appellant understood the parties' agreement. 
Though she may have had reservations, she acquiesced upon her 
attorney's advise. She chose to proceed. Certainly there was not 
"duress" here as in Harsh, supra, where the parties had no 
viable option but to reach a settlement agreement on better terms 
than the foregone conclusion of a directed verdict. Nor has there 
been a change of conditions upon which appellant's Stipulation was 
based or a question as to appellant's intent as in Runyon, supra. 
Appellant here knew the terms of the Stipulation, and the purpose 
of the meeting. She proceeded with her attorney to record what 
she knew to be the parties' settlement agreement. (R. at 180, 
242-243; T. at 7,8; Addendum A-2) 
At the time the parties' settlement agreement was 
recorded before a court reporter as their Stipulation, all 
parties and their attorneys were present. Everyone present, 
except the appellant, interjected as the comprehensive 
Stipulation for settlement was recorded. (R. at 238, 243, 244; 
T. at 3, 8, 9) It should have been apparent to appellant that 
she, also, could have interjected if she had concerns or 
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disagreement. Appellant, however, expressed no reservations, 
made no objections, nor repudiated any portion of the Stipulation 
at that time. She said nothing. (R. at 244; T. at 9) The 
recorded Stipulation as recited in appellants presence by the 
parties1 attorneys begins by acknowledging that the parties have 
reached a settlement, and immediately thereafter states the 
provisions relating to alimony and child support in no uncertain 
terms. (Addendum A-8) It is easily subject to clear 
understanding. As this Court has recognized, the issue as to 
whether a party agreed to and should be bound by a stipulation is 
one of fact for the trial court to determine. Klein v. Klein, 
544 P. 2d 472 (Utah 1975); accord, Baird, supra. Here, there is 
substantial evidence that appellant negotiated, understood and 
consented to the parties' Stipulation. The record clearly 
supports the Minute Entry of the court below, that Mthe 
settlement agreement was fully negotiated between the parties and 
counsel; that all issues were considered and an agreement was 
struck and entered on the record and that all parties and their 
counsel consented to the terms." (R. at 190; Addendum A-24) 
The evidence firmly supports the findings of the lower court that 
the parties appeared with their attorneys before a court reporter 
for the purpose of setting forth their settlement agreement, and 
that all issues were considered, an agreement was struck and 
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entered on the record, and the parties and their counsel consented 
to the terms. (R. at 200; Addendum A-26) 
Upon facts clearly analagous to those in the present 
case, this Court has upheld the parties1 stipulation where a 
party who evidenced his consent to it later sought to repudiate 
it. In Klein, supra, where the appellant claimed he didn't 
understand the proceedings involving the stipulation and that he 
didnft agree to the terms but assumed that negotiations would 
continue and that he would have an opportunity to examine the 
stipulation once it was reduced to writing, this Court affirmed 
the decision of the court below which bound that party to the 
terms of the stipulation. Likewise, where the record indicates 
something less than a clear understanding and uneauivocal 
agreement to a stipulation, the court upheld a stipulation 
entered into by the parties where one party later repudiates the 
agreement. Bean v. Carlos, 21 Utah 2d 309, 445 P.2d 144 (1968); 
Baird, supra. Simply stated, appellant's grounds for seeking 
relief from the parties1 Stipulation are not supported by the law 
or the evidence, and do not approach the degree of justification 
necessary for relief at law or in equity. She claims no fraud. 
The weight of the evidence does not support mistake or her claim 
of misunderstanding or duress sufficient for relief from her 
agreement. 
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Although appellant argues that she not only has 
justification for relief from her stipulation but was timely 
within her power in repudiating the parties1 Stipulation, thereby 
meeting the Klein test, supra, the weight of evidence on the 
issue does not bear out her assertion. Prior to the time the 
parties and their attorneys set forth their Stipulation before 
the court reporter, the terms of the agreement were discussed 
between appellant and her attorney. She did not refuse to enter 
into the agreement then, but instead chose to proceed in having 
the agreement recorded as her Stipulation. (R. at 179-180, 242; 
T. at 7; Addendum A-21) At the time the Stipulation was 
recorded in her presence, she could have objected, expressed any 
mental reservation she may have had, or recanted; appellant failed 
to do so. (R. at 244; T. at 9) Nor did she do so immediately 
after the parties1 settlement agreement was recorded when any 
repudiation could have been made apparent to all parties in her 
presence. Further, she made no objection the following day when 
she was away from the pressure of the deposition hearing. She 
made no objection when respondent began paying, and she accepted 
the increased support payments under the Stipulation in July as 
respondent started exercising his expanded summer visitation. 
Instead, appellant waited over five months from the date the 
parties1 settlement agreement was recorded as their Stipulation, 
and three to four months from the time the written Stipulation was 
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presented, before expressing any objection to the respondent. 
(R. at 240; T. at 5) Even then appellant made no formal request 
to the court for relief, but merely informed respondent by 
inference that she opposed enforcement of the Stipulation. 
(Addendum A-42) Though appellant claims there were delays in 
her receipt of the written Stipulation and in meeting with her 
attorney after the Stipulation was recorded on June 5, 1984, 
(R. at 243-245; T. at 8-10) she could have expressed her 
objections by letter or telephone call to her attorney. It is 
uncontroverted that she did not attempt to do so. (R. at 251; 
T. at 16) For over five months from the time the parties recorded 
their Stipulation, and for three to four months from the time the 
writing based upon that Stipulation was presented, no objection 
was heard from appellant. 
In the meantime, and as appellant must have known, the 
August trial date for litigation of any disagreement between the 
parties—if in fact appellant had a disagreement — was stricken 
and passed. The respondent continued to meet his increased 
financial obligations under the provisions of the parties1 
Stipulation, and the appellant recognized the Stipulation and 
accepted those benefits without expressed objection or 
reservation. (R. at 239, 245, 247; T. at 4, 10, 12) Summer 
visitation with the parties1 minor chidren was conducted pursuant 
to the parties1 Stipulation. (R. at 240; Tl at 5) Still, no 
23 
objection to the Stipulation or its provisions was expressed by 
appellant. At the time of hearing on respondent's Motion for 
Approval and Enforcement of the parties1 Stipulation, the 
respondent had met his increased financial burden under that 
agreement of over $2,000 with the loss of a trial date and 
certain tax benefits related to alimony payments. (R. at 239-
240, 245; T. at 4-5, 10) 
Clearly appellant's objection to the parties' 
Stipulation, made informally over five months from the date of 
the parties' agreement, is not timely under the Klein test, or 
the facts present in this case. Noting that application for 
relief from a stipulation must be timely made, this Court accords 
discretion to the trial court in determining whether a 
stipulation should be vacated. United Factors, supra; Johnson 
v. Peoples Finance and Thrift Co., 2 Utah 2d 246, 272 P.2d 171, 
(1954). There, this court affirmed denial of applications for 
relief brough upon motions to vacate a stipulation as within the 
court's discretion. It was certainly within the discretion of 
the court below to enforce the parties' Stipulation under the 
circumstances of this case. Though appellant asserts that 
respondent did not reasonably rely on the parties' Stipulation 
where the written stipulation was not returned, the respondent 
could not be expected to know appellant's unexpressed repudiation 
and mental reservations concerning the parties' Stipulation in 
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view of appellant's conduct, which from every outward appearance 
evidenced her continuing agreement with the parties1 Stipulation 
and her intent to be bound by it. 
The Order of the court below enforcing the terms of the 
parties1 Stipulation was an appropriate exercise of that court's 
discretion under the facts and circumstances existing in this case. 
As this Court has noted on more than one occassion: 
...when the parties failed to perform in 
accordance with their stipulations, the 
court is not powerless to require them 
to abide by their agreement. It would 
indeed be a serious relection on our 
system of jurisprudence if parties could 
stipulate an agreement of settlement but 
refuse with impunity from performing. 
Courts are not impotent when one or more 
parties to a stipulation becomes recalcitrant. 
People's Finance and Thrift Co., supra at 172; Bean v. 
Carlos, 21 Utah 2d 309, 145 P.2d 144 at 146 (1968). 
In view of the total circumstances of this case, the 
approval and enforcement of the parties' stipulation which 
substantially increased total support and alimony to appellant, 
and obligated respondent to additionally meet past and future 
orthodontal expenses for the children appears fair. The 
resulting Orders fashioned by the lower court upon the 
Stipulation and modifying the parties' Amended Decree of 
Divorce appears just and equitable under the total circumstances 
of this case. 
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CONCLDSION 
In divorce cases and in subsequent proceedings for 
modification this Court has invariably held that the decision of 
the trial judge is to be respected unless it clearly appears that 
he has abused his discretion or manifestly misapplied relevant 
law to the substantial prejudice of the appealing party. The 
standard of review appropriately grants deference to the 
advantaged position of the trial judge who has received evidence 
presented on the issues and become acquainted with the parties, 
their problems, and the totality of the circumstances relating to 
the issues. 
Although appellant is dissatisfied with the rulings of 
the trial court, her subjective dissatisfaction is neither an 
appropriate nor sufficient ground for modification or reversal of 
the trial court's ruling. The court below appropriately applied 
the relevant law on the issues and did not agree that appellant 
was justified in relief from the Stipulation. Nowhere does 
appellant isolate an instance in which Judge SawayaTs judgment 
substantially and prejudically errs against her or his findings 
are not firmly supported by substantial evidence. It was clearly 
with the trial court's discretion to determine whether or not the 
appellant understood and agreed to the Stipulation. The evidence 
clearly supports the findings that all issues were considered by 
the parties and an agreement was struck. In view of the 
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negotiations between the parties, the discussion of the terms of 
the Stipulation between appellant and her attorney and the 
purpose of the meeting prior to the time the Stipulation was 
recorded on June 5, 1984, and appellant's presence with her 
attorney at the time the Stipulation was recorded, there was 
certainly no clear abuse of discretion by the trial court in 
finding that the Stipulation was agreed upon and consented to. 
The evidence firmly supports the court's finding that 
appellant made no objection to the Stipulation for over five 
months, during which time she reaped the benefits of the 
Stipulation to respondent's substantial detriment, and that her 
conduct estopped her from denying the agreement. Appellant 
expressed no objection to the stipulation from June 5, 1984 until 
her new attorney contacted respondent by letter over five months 
later. She accepted the increased financial benefits from the 
respondent without objection and allowed summer visitation 
pursuant to the Stipulation. By all outward appearances she 
treated the Stipulation as binding. The trial court 
appropriately exercised its discretion in declining to accept 
appellant's objection to the Stipulation as being timely made. 
Stipulations in settlement of divorce and modification 
actions are advisory on the trial court, anyway, and the court 
below could consider the total facts and circumstances of the 
case to fashion a just decree. The Order of the lower court, 
27 
though based primarily on the Stipulation of the parties and the 
circumstances relating to it, is not inequitable in light of the 
total facts of the case indicating not only an increase in 
respondent's income but a dramatic increase in his financial 
responsibilities, and an educational level at which the appellant, 
with her specialized skills and freedom from committments, could 
obtain employment to contribute to her support. The approval 
and enforcement of the Stipulation increasing respondent's total 
support to appellant and further obligating him on all past and 
future orthodontial expenses is fair and not a clear abuse of 
the court's discretion. 
The Order entered by Judge Sawaya reflects careful and 
judicious consideration of the parties, their problems, and their 
interests. In the absence of clear abuse of discretion or 
manifest injustice, as in this case, the rulings of the trial 
court should not be disturbed. Therefore, Judge Sawaya's 
decision should be affirmed in its entirety. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of September, 1985. 
DART, ADAMSON & PARKEN 
B y „ 
B. L. DAftt 
By 
JOHN D. SHEAFFER, JR. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of , 
1985 I hand-delivered four copies of the forgoing Brief to attorney 
for appellant, David A. McPhie, at his office located at 147 North 
Second West, Salt Lake City, Utah 84103. 
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State Bar #818 
DART, PARKEN & PROCTOR 
Attorneys at Law 
430 Ten Broadway Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: Brown v. Brown 
Civil No. D-79-3802 
Dear Bert: 
/ In connection with your letter dated April 3, 198 4, I have 
I had the opportunity of reviewing the same at length with Mrs. 
Brown. It should be noted at the outset that the general tenor 
of your letter is certainly reasonable. It should further be 
noted that Mrs. Brown has contacted the Career Counseling Service 
at the University of Utah and has an appointment within the next 
several weeks. Evidently, Mrs. Brown will attempt to procure 
employment in the communications, advertising and/or T.V./radio 
industries. She is in the process of speaking with K.S.L. 
television and is hopeful that something beneficial will occur 
shortly. In attempting to procure employment in these areas, 
Mrs. Brown has gone through a rather difficult decision-making 
effort. She has furthermore been informed that entry level 
salaries in these areas are very low and that it will more than 
likely be necessary that a great deal of re-schooling take place. 
For the above reasons, Mrs. Brown would desire that alimony 
continue at the same level it currently is for a period of 
thirty-six (36) months. At that time, alimony should terminate. 
In the interim, Mrs. Brown would request that child support be 
increased from $300.00 per child to $550.00 per child for a total 
of $1,650.00, based upon Dr. Brown's substantial increase in 
salary since the entry of the Decree of Divorce. This position 
in the long run is beneficial for both of the parties in that it 
decreases Dr. Brownfs long-term obligations ^nd gives Mrs. Brown 




May 10, 1984 
Page Two 
In connection with the above alimony and support award, Mrs. 
Brown would request that Dr. Brown provide life insurance for the 
benefit of the minor children until the children reach the age of 
21, marry or become self supporting. 
Your suggestion with regard to the health and dental 
insurance is obviously acceptable, with the additional provision 
that Dr. Brown be responsible for the outstanding obligation 
presently due and owing to Dr. Gary Stevens and that Mrs. Brown 
have the obligation of providing Dr. Brown the medical, dental 
and orthodontal bills within a reasonable period of time not to 
exceed thirty (30) days. 
As to visitation, Dr. Brown's requests in paragraphs 2 and 4 
are acceptable. Mrs. Brown informs me that these paragraphs 
embody the parties1 general working agreement. With regard to 
the other paragraphs, Mrs. Brown would comment as follows: 
a. Paragraph 1 - It should be noted at the outset 
that Mrs. Brown does not plan events just to annoy Dr. 
Brown. Sometimes, it is rather difficult to give Dr. Brown 
notification of activities in advance. A recent example is 
that of Darren's baseball game. Evidently, Darren's coach 
contacted Mrs. Brown while the child was visiting with Dr. 
Brown and informed her that a baseball game had been 
rescheduled for the next day. Obviously, Mrs. Brown will 
attempt to keep Dr. Brown informed of the children's 
activities and will attempt not to schedule activities for 
Dr. Brown's visitation time. She furthermore agrees to use 
her best efforts to do so, but rejects the requirement that 
Dr. Brown be notified one to two weeks in advance of the 
activities. 
b. Paragraph 3 - Mrs. Brown would propose that the 
parties split the Christmas holiday with Dr. Brown to have 
the children on Christmas Eve day until 9:00 p.m.. The 
remaining Christmas visitation would take place as agreed 
upon by the parties. 
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'V and wait for the children. 
. ^ - Paragraph 6 - Mrs. Brown informs this office that 
with rcHKtrd t o s u m m e r visitation she has been more than 
flexible*. Evidently, Dr. Prownf for the last several 
summers, has
 h a d t h e children for the summer holidays plus 
in ex-ooc*^
 af t w o w e e ] c s # Mrs. Brown would desire that such 
schedule continue. 
*• Paragraph 7 - As stated above, Mrs. Brown would 
have nn wroblems in using her best efforts to provide Er. 
Brow:- vi-^ schedules of the children's performances and 
othex- «x~ ra-curricular activities. 
Obviovuaiv your proposal with regard to attorney's fees 
is acceptable. * 
Mrs. Br0wn would request several additional clarifications 
of the or?.q{M, ^  D e c r e e # she would desire that Dr. Brown inform 
her in ad\-a!KV when and where he is taking the children when he 
leaves th^ ^\;y. in addition, Mrs. Brown would appreciate being 
allowed r-^ ar.o.r.able telephonic access to the children anc Dr. 
Brown whe^ t*^ children are visiting with Dr. Brown and M s wife. 
Evidently, t?^ r e have been some problems in the past in this 
regard. 
So tNat Airs. Brown will be able to plan on receipt of her 
support arvl a - imony sums on a regular and consistent bas.is, Mrs. 
Brown wouV, ct*sire" that the proposed Order set forth that support 
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The only remaining issue is the question of the children's 
accounts at Jordan Credit Union, Valley Bank/Olympus Branch and 
Draper Bank. Mrs. Brown would request that her name be put on 
these accounts, and that she and Dr. Brown be co-trustees with 
rights of survivorship for the children. 
If the above is agreeable, then I will be more than glad to 
prepare the necessary Stipulation. 
I await your reply. 
Very t r i j l y y o u r s , 
GUSTIW, JIDAMS, I^STING & LIAPIS 
PAUL H. LIAPIS ' 
PHL:ib 
E n c l o s u r e s 
c c : Carol Brown 
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May 30 , 1984 
Paul H. L i a p l s 
48 Post Office Place 
Third Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Re: Brown v. Brown 
Dear Paul: 
I have now reviewed your letter of May 10 with Dr« 
Brown, and I would like to propose some alternatives that may 
bring us to the point we can settle this action. 
Your proposal that your client's alimony continue for 
three years at its current level is not acceptable, Your client 
has already had four years to reestablish herself, and your 
proposal would take Dr. Brown's current support and alimony 
obligation from $1800 to $2400 a month. Dr. Brown would be 
willing to settle with her on an arrangement of support at $500 a 
month per child with the alimony to continue for a two year 
period at the rate of $500 a month. This would provide your 
client with a $2,000 a month payment at the present time, which 
is $200 in excess of what she is currently receiving and within 
the next two years, she should be fully able to obtain what other 
training she might need for employment and have located a job to 
meet her needs. 
Dr. Brown is willing to continue maintaining life 
insurance on his life for the next two years while the alimony 
obligation is in place with his former wife as beneficiary. He 
is also willing to continue maintaining life insurance on the 
minor children of the parties so long as he has an obligation for 
support. With respect to the proposal for the payment of dental 
and orthodontic expenses, Dr. Brown was not intending to include 
expenses which have been incurred to this time, and he does not 
intend to include the payment of medical expenses which are not 
covered by the health and accident insurance carried by him on 
the children. The health and accident insurance has a $100 
deductible and so the medical expense to your client should not 
be too substantial. Dr. Brown does inform me that if we can get 
all the issues in this case resolved, then as an incentive to 
reach settlement, he would pick up the obligation which is 
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We still have difficulties on your proposal on 
visitation. Your letter does not respond to paragraph 2 of our 
letter, but since these holidays were provided for in the decree 
of divorce, I assume you do not disagree with that paragraph. 
With respect to paragraph 3, your response is not satisfactory as 
Dr. Brown should have an opportunity to have the children for a 
week commencing on the 26th of December, which would give your 
client Christmas Day and effectively the week before Christmas. 
I am confident that if this matter were presented to a court, 
that request would be granted. Your letter does not respond to 
paragraph 4 of our letter, and I would assume that request is 
also acceptable to you. 
Finally, your proposal concerning the summer visitation 
is not acceptable. The children have now reached an age where a 
one month period is reasonable, and again, a period of time which 
I am confident the Court would allow to Dr. Brown. The two week 
period is simply not a sufficient time for Dr. Brown to share 
with his children during the summer months. 
I would appreciate it if you would review the above 
proposals with your client, and then let me know whether we can 
strike an agreement to avoid a contest. It will also avoid the 
necessity of taking your client's deposition which is currently 
scheduled for the 5th of June at 10:00 a.m. 
I will look forward to receiving your reply. 
Yours very truly, 
B. L. Dart 
BLD/jmo 
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S T I P U L A T I O N 
MR. DART: For the benefit of the record that 
we're staring, we have, been discussing with both clients 
and both attorneys various settlement proposals that have 
gone back and forth over the past month and a half, two and 
a half,months, excuse me, and we now have reached a point 
where we have a settlement understanding that we're all desiroi 
of having put down in writing. And to that end we're going 
to read it into the record, and then we'll obtain a transcript 
so that any confusion that might exist in the future can 
be clarified by that transcript and then there will be a 
formal written stipulation and a formal order drafted based 
upon the agreement we reached today. 
The stipulation would be that in connection 
with the currently pending petition for modification, that 
that petition will be resolved by amendments and agreements 
as follows: 
Number 1, the alimony award currently existing 
shall be modified to provide that Mrs. Brown, commencing 
with July of 1984, will have her alimony payment reduced 
from the current level of $900 to the sum of $500, and that 
that payment shall continue for a period of two years, at 
which time it will terminate. And that this payment of alimony 
shall be payable on or before the fifth day of each month. 
It's been expressed that there are difficulties 
HARMON, SHINDURLING, BROWN & TRACKER 
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in the house payment being paid, and as an accommodation, 
if the doctor can make payment before the 5th, he is of an 
awareness that there is a desire that that be done. 
I think it also ought to be expressed that the 
modification of alimony is made on the contemplation that 
by two years from now Mrs. Brown will have been able to have 
sought and obtained employment sufficient to allow a termination 
of the alimony award. 
The support will be modified commencing with 
the month of July to be increased from the current amount 
of $300 per child to the sum of $500 per child for each of 
the three children. Payments of support are due and payable 
on or before the 5th, and the payment of support shall continue 
to age 21, on the same terms that existed in the decree of 
divorce as to the conditions of which payment would continue. 
I think those were that the children be, unless they became 
married or emancipated or not continue with their school. 
DR. BROWN: It's eighteen unless they serve 
a mission or go to college, aiid then it continues to age 
twenty-one. 
MR. DART: Whatever the terms of the decree 
are, they will provide, except with the modification that 
any child not living at home will have the payment of support 
paid directly to the child after age eighteen. 
MR, LIAP1S: With the proviso that t^ he Plaintiff 
hAuMwis. SttlNDuRLIN'G, bRO*VN & THACKER 
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the right for enforcement of collection if they are 
directly to the child. 
MR. DART: The doctor also will agree to pay for 
ia treatment which has been provided to this time 
by Dr. Gary Stephens, the outstanding bill at this time, and 
I think it also should be expressed that he will have to possit 
make some 
but I don 
as there 
orthodont 
arrangements to possibly make some installments, 
1t know what it is. 
That he, further, will be responsible so long 
is an obligation for support, to pay the children's 
ia and dentist expenses. He shall further be responsi 






, which has a $100 deductible. Any expenses not descr 
d by insurance would be the responsibility of Mrs. 
her health and treatment. 
The doctor also will continue in force his curre 
life insurance that has the children as beneficiaries, 
obligation will continue so long as there's an obligat 
for support. He will also continue in force his currently-
existing life insurance on Mrs. Brown so long as he has an 




it's a $50,000, and also the children's is a $50,000 
MR. LIAPIS: Further, the doctor will pay against 
s fees that have been incurred by Mrs. Brown in 
• -
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this proceeding. The amount of these 
When? 
MR. DART: Within thirty 
I think that covers all of the financi 
If it doesn't, let me know. 
The agreement relating 
insurance should have, as part of it, 
Mrs. Brown would have the obligation o 
the medical and dental and orthodontal 
time not to exceed thirty days of when 
fees to the sum of $3,500. 
days of billing. And 
al items that we've discuss-
to continuation of health 
che understanding that 
f providing to Dr. Brown 
bills within a reasonable 
they are received. Paul 
and I discussed this, assuming there is an item that has not 
been discussed and not mentioned here, and so it is an item 
of oversight, that either side would have the right to get 
an agreement on that or have the Court solve it. 
MR, LIAPIS: That's correct. 
MR. DART: The next item 
component is that the original decree 
the Jordan Credit Union, Valley Bank, 
that has a financial 
of divorce provided that 
Olympus Branch, and Draper 
Bank accounts that were accounts for the children be transferred 
to Mrs. Brown. Dr. Brown thought that 
it's his recall that he had provided yo 
sufficient to do that and thought that 
he had done that, and 
u with signature cards 
that was an accomplished 
fact. If it is not an accomplished fact, he's willing to, 
of course, do that. 
The stipulation will be that Mrs. Brown will 
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provide to Dr. Brown the account numbers on each of the invol 
accounts and that Dr. Brown will take whatever steps are nece 
to have his name removed from the accounts so that Mrs, Brown 
name can be placed on the accounts. 
The next area is the area of Dr. Brown's right 
of visitation, and the understanding and agreement relating 
to that visitation is that he will have reasonable rights of 
visitation with the minor children, and that his rights of 
visitation, in addition to anything we describe, will include 
anything that the parties can mutually agree upon, 
I put that in so that you're both aware that 
you're not locked into this if you both agree to something 
different. But beyond that, his rights of visitation would 
be to have, A, the children with him on alternate weekends 
with that visitation right being altered from its current ful 
weekend period to provide from Friday evening at 6:00 p.m. 
to Saturday evening at 6:00 p.m. 
Two, the agreement is that Mrs. Brown will not 
schedule any activites for the children which will in any way 
conflict with Dr. Brown's visitation time without first consu 
with Dr. Brown, and in the event that the parties are not abl< 
to agree on such an activity being scheduled for Dr. Brown's 
visitation time, then either party would have the right to 
bring the matter before the Court for a determination. 
Upon scheduling activities occurring at Dr. 
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Brown's visitation time that he agrees that he will do whatever 
is necessary to see that the children participate in that 
activity. And another element of that, Mrs, Brown will provide 
reasonable advance notice of any of the activities that the 
children are involved in, and that there be at least some 
advance notice, as much as possible, of any of the activities 
the children are participating in in which they are performing 
in a competitive activity or in which they are participating 
in front of an audience that includes adults or other parents. 
Dr. Brown would have the right to have the children 
on alternate holidays, and I think that's scheduled in the 
decree of divorce. And when those holidays are Monday holidays 
which come on the weekend he has visitation, he'd have the 
full weekend for three days, including Sunday. So he'll 
have visitation on those weekends would be from Friday at 
6:00 until Monday at 6:00 p.m. 
He would have the right to have the children 
each New Year and during the Christmas holiday commencing 
Christmas Day at 1:00 o'clock, that that visitation will 
continue through the remainder of the Christmas vacation 
unless there are less than five days of Christmas vacation 
before Christmas, and in 
to be worked out so that 
the Christmas break. 
That in the 
that event, then the time will have 
she has at least five days during 
summer he will have the right to 
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have them with him for a month, and this year that will be 
the month of July. That while he is out of town he 
provide an itinerary, and a reciprocal is that when 
Brown takes the children out of town, she will also 
an itinerary for Dr. Brown. 
town, Mrs. 
That during the month of July while he 











be entitled to have one visit with them during 
The visitation each summer will be agreed upon 
Dr. Brown to notify you at least sixty days in 
of when he 
time 
that 
would like to have the month, and at: the 




period that you would have the right to have them. And 
the same understanding on the right to converse with them 
while they' 
need 
re in town by telephone would exist and also the 
to provide you with an itinerary would also exist-
The understanding is that the parties will consul 
at least ninety days before the beginning of the summer of 
their anticipated schedules to make sure that there are no 
conflicts and to try and flex around potential conflicts 
that 
have 
might exist. If there is a conflict, either p< 
the right to ask the Court to resolve it if it 
to that po: Lnt. 
arty would 
gets 
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as 
And further, Dr. Blown would represent that 
soon as he knows when he might be going, even if itrs 
five or six months in advance, he'll provide you with that 







ortunity to register for summer activity that requires 
early registration, you'll notify the doctor so he can 
you know whether that might conflict with his plans. 
again, the hope is there will be mutual accommodation. 
The next item is the doctor will have the right 
visit with the children frequently at times other than 
se outlined provided that the visitation does not conflict 





The next, Mrs. Brown will allow either Dr. Brown 
his present wife to pick up and return the children, but 
the event that it's the current Mrs. Brown picking them 
that she will honk for the children and drive away. If 
children do not come or she's notified when the children 
will be there within five minutes, then she'll have the right 
to 
on 
go to the door and get that information. 
We'll provide, relative to the life insurance 
the children, that the three children will remain as 
beneficiaries on that policy so long as there's an obligation 
for 
for 
support of any child. As soon as there's no obligation 
support, then the obligation to maintain the policy will 
terminate. 
HARMON, SHINDURLING. BROWN & THACKER* 
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That so long as the policy is in force, if any 
of the children are no longer supported, Mrs, Brc.m would 
have the right to notify Dr. Brown of her desire to elect 
that the policy have the names of the non-supported child 
removed from the policy so it enters the benefit of only 
the supported children. 
The doctor will provide evidence that both of 
his life insurance policies are currently in force. 
II 
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STATE OF UTAH § 
§ ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE § 
I, Cecilee Gruendell, do hereby certify that 
I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in 
the State of Utah; that as such Reporter T attended the hearing 
of the foregoing matter, and thereat reported in stenotype 
all the statements and proceedings had therein; that thereafter 
I caused to be transcribed my said stenographic notes into 
typewriting, and the foregoing pages numbered from 2 to 10, 
inclusive, constitute a full, true, and correct report of 
the same. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 15th day 
of June, 1984. 
Cecilee Gruendell 
C.S.R. License No. 167 
My commission expires: 
March 10, 1986. 
* * * 
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DAVID A. McPHIE 
A Professional Corporation 
AFFLECK & McPHIE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
i 147 North Second West 
.Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
< Telephone: 531-5333 






 County Utah 
FEB 25 1985 
S^^fe^a^*-^ Court 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
; CAROL ANN BARKER BROWN, 
•j Plaintiff, 
ii 
.i V S . 
I-BRYANT JEROME BROWN, 
I' Defendant. 
i-
AFFIDAVIT OF CAROL BROWN 
Civil No. D79-3S02 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
I' : ss. 
|COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Comes now Carol Brown, and being first duly sworn 
», oath, deposes and states: 
1 
1. That I am the Carol Brown who is the plain 
lj
 in this case. 









; the decree of divorce. 
4 
3. That he, after hearing my story about my former 
Phusband's increased income, and after reviewing my decree of 
! divorce, assured me that an increase in alimony and child support 
| was justified. 
ji 4. That a l l through the period he represented me, 
approx imate ly eighteen months, a period in which we were 
! preparing for t r i a l , my former attorney expressed confidence 
S tha t T would win major increases in both child support and 
I,alimony. 
J1 5. That in late April of 1984, my former attorney 
s 
i notified me that I would need to come to a deposition to be hel< 
! 
I June 5, 1984, at 10:00 a.nu 
j 6. That on the day of the deposi t ion, my forme 
."attorney advised me for the first time that: 
a. I wasn't going to get more alimony, but rathe 
that I would loose i t . 
b. That my increases in child support would not offs 
the decrease in alimony. 
; c. That T needed to agree to my former husband 
requests for increased visitation, which I considered outragec 
because the court would grant i t anyway. 
11 
i 
I d. That we were about to go on the record in I 
Dart's office, and agree to all of the above, because he 1 
i told Mr. Dart I would agree, and it was pointless to go to coi 
j'anyway. 
jj 7. That I was shocked, dismayed, dissapointed
 f 
•'confused. It appeared to me that my attorney had changed 
(position of eighteen months, overnight. He tried to expl< 
I to me why his assessment of my case had changed suddenly. 
. was unsatisfied by his explanation, but the deposition was 
h 
i;hand, and he insisted that I stipulate and agree, 
i 
! 8. That I next went into the room and listened 
1 
HMr. Dart, my former husband, and Mr. Liapis talk abou 
!settlement agreement, and a court reporter took it all do1 
ii 
|» I d o n ' t r e c a l l whether or not I said anything a t tha t t ime, 
h I c e r t a i n t l y d i d n ' t agree. 
jj 9. That later a written stipulation was sent to 
1
 Liapis by Mr. Dart, which he asked me to s ign . 
i 1 0 . T h a t I r e f u s e d t o s i g n t h e a g r e e m e n t < 
tj s t i p u l a t i o n document because i t ' s provis ions were unfair in 
;; opinion. 
j! 11. Mr. Liapis insisted that I had to sign, an 
i 
! ! 
I dispute arose which led me to seek new counsel. 
1'c 
12. That, but for the exchange of a few documents, 
j'most of which have been previously requested by me, this case 
is ready for trial. 
13. That I may be wrong, Mr. Liapis may be rightr 
{
'but after having gone this far and spent as much money as I have, 
J}X want my day in court. 
!i 
DATED this Xf day of February, 1985. 
-7 , / is • 
Carol Brown 
Subscr ibed and sworn to before me, a Notary Pub l i c , 
t h i s ?5^day of February, 1985. 
My Commission Expires: 
Notary Public . 
Residing a t :
 (S/RT LAve. Cdui/fH 
i 31 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a Lruc and correct copy 
of the foregoing Affidavit of Carol Brown, postage prepaid, 
to B.L. Dart, 310 South Main, Suite 1330, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84101, on this 25th day of February, 1985. 
Deborah Marr, cretary 
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V 
RRYANT JEROME BROWN 
COUNSEL: (*• COUNSEL PRESENT) 
: B . L . D a r t 
: D a v i d A. .".dPhie 





James S . Sawaya 
DATE: A p r i l 1 6 , 1985 
JUDGI 
The matter of Defendant's Motion for Order Appovina and 
Enforcing Settlement Agreement came on regularly for hearing 
on Apirl 15, 198 5 with appearances as above indicated« The matter 
was fully presented, argued and submitted and the decision thereof 
taken under advisement by the Court, The Court, having now fully 
reviewed and considered the matter makes its ruling and decision 
thereon as follows: 
It would appear that in spite of Plaintiff's protestations, the 
settlement agreement was fully negotiated between the parties and 
counsel; that all issues were considered and an agreement v/as struck 
and entered on the record and that all parties and counsel consented 
to the terms• Equity dictates that the sanctity of that aareemtn 
should be presered and should Prevail. Defendant's Motion is aranted 
COPIES TO co^SELrr^nQ^ry^? ,^ jc^cs' A~24 131 
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B. L. DART (818) 
Attorney for Defendant 
310 South Main 
Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 521-6383 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
CAROL ANN BARKER BROWN, : 
Plaintiff, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
v. : 
BRYANT JEROME BROWN, : Civil No. D79-3802 
Defendant. : Judge Sawaya 
oooOooo 
Defendant's Motion for an Order enforcing the 
provisions of an agreement entered into between the parties 
on the 5th of June, 1984, came on regularly for hearing on 
Monday, the 15th day of April, 1985, at the hour of 2:00 o'clock 
p.m. Defendant appearing in person and by his attorney B. L. 
Dart, and plaintiff appearing in person and by her attorney 
David A. McPhie, and the Court having heard the arguments and 
proffers of respective attorneys and having reviewed the file 
and being fully advised, hereby makes the following: 
A-25 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Following the filing of plaintiff's Petition for 
Modification and defendant's Counter Petition, there was 
extensive discovery carried out between the parties following 
which the parties engaged in extensive negotiation through their 
respective attorneys. 
2. On the 5th day of June, 1984, the parties appeared 
at a proceeding before a court reporter for the purpose of 
setting forth the terms of a settlement agreement which had been 
reached between the parties, and with both parties in attendance 
with their attorneys the terms of the agreement were read into 
the record with input provided by attorneys for both of the 
parties. At that time all issues were considered and an 
agreement was struck and entered on the record and all the 
parties and counsels consented to the terms either affirmatively 
or impliedly by not objecting to any of the terms of the 
Stipulation. 
3. For a period from the 5th of June, 1984, until the 
30th of November, 1984, plaintiff made no objection to the 
Stipulation which had been reached on the record and had been 
reduced to a written Stipulation and presented to her for her 
signature. During this period of time she received the 
additional financial benefits under the terms of the Stipulation 
which included an increase in the amounts paid by defendant to 
2 £Q0 
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plaintiff of $200 per month. 
4. Plaintiff by her conduct is estopped from denying 
this agreement and defendant has relied to his detriment on 
plaintiff's acceptance of the benefits and equity dictates that 
the sanctity of that agreement should be preserved and should 
prevail. 
From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court now 
makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant's Motion for an Order appproving and 
enforcing the settlement agreement is hereby granted. 
2. The Stipulation of the parties is accepted by the 
Court and the Decree of Divorce heretofore entered in this action 
may be modified in accordance with that Stipulation as more fully 
hereinafter set forth. 
3. The Decree of Divorce is modified to provide that 
plaintiff's award of alimony shall be reduced from the amount of 
$900 a month to the amount of $500 a month commencing with the 
month of July, 1984, and continuing thereafter for a period of 
two years or until plaintiff remarries whichever occurs first. 
Upon the happening of either event, alimony will terminate. 
Defendant's payment of alimony shall be due on or before the 5th 




So long as defendant has an obligation for alimony, 
he is ordered to maintain plaintiff as a named insured on a 
currently existing life insurance policy in the face amount of 
$50,000. Defendant is ordered to provide plaintiff with evidence 
that this life insurance is currently in force. 
4. The Decree of Divorce is modified to provide that 
defendant's obligation to plaintiff for support shall be 
increased from a sum of $300 per month to a sum of S500 per month 
per child for each of the three minor children of the parties 
commencing with the month of July, 1984. Payments of support are 
due on or before the 5th day of each month and defendants 
obligation for support shall continue to age 21 for any child who 
shall elect to serve a mission for the LDS Church, or shall 
elect to attend a college or university. For any such child over 
the age of 18 not living at home, the payment of support shall be 
paid by defendant directly to said child. If payment of support 
is not paid to said child by defendant, plaintiff shall retain 
the right for enforcement of collection. 
As an additional obligation of support, defendant 
is ordered to pay for orthodontia treatment which has been 
provided to this time by Dr. Gary Stephens and to pay for any 
orthodontia and dentist expenses for any child so long as there 
is an obligation for the payment of support for said child. 




on his health and accident insurance which has a $100 per child 
deductible. Plaintiff is ordered to provide to defendant all 
medical, dental and orthodontia bills within a reasonable amount 
of time not to exceed 30 days of when they are received.. Any 
medical expenses not described or covered by insurance will be 
the responsibility of plaintiff. 
As a further obligation for support, defendant is 
ordered to maintain in force his currently existing life 
insurance with the children named thereon as beneficiaries so 
long as defendant has an obligation for support. This life 
insurance policy has a $50,000 death benefit. So long as the 
life insurance policy is in force, if defendants obligation to 
pay support for any child terminates, plaintiff will have the 
right to notify defendant of her desire to elect that the policy 
have the name or names of the non-supported child or children 
removed from the policy so that it retains only the supported 
children as named beneficiaries. Unless such an election is made 
by plaintiff, defendant shall retain all children as named 
beneficiaries on the life insurance policy until his obligation 
to support the last child is terminated. 
5. Plaintiff is ordered to provide to defendant the 
account numbers of the Jordan Credit Union, Valley Bank/Olympus 
Branch, and Draper Bank accounts that are the accounts for the 
children awarded in the Decree of Divorce to be transferred to 
5 
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plaintiff* Upon receipt of these account numbers, defendant is 
ordered to take whatever steps are necessary to have his name 
removed from the accounts so that plaintiffs name can be placed 
upon the accounts, 
6. The Decree of Divorce should be modified to 
provide, in addition to what other rights of visitation the 
parties may in the future mutually agree upon, the following: 
a. Defendant shall have the right to have the 
children with him on alternate weekends from Friday evening at 
6:00 p.m. to Saturday evening at 6:00 p.m0 
b. Plaintiff is ordered not to schedule any 
activities for the children which will in any way conflict with 
defendant's visitation time without first consulting with 
defendant and in the event the parties are not able to agree on 
such an activity being scheduled for defendant's visitation time, 
then either party will have the right to bring the matter before 
the Court for determination. In the event activities are 
scheduled as agreed upon or determined by the Court during 
defendant's visitation time, defendant is ordered to do whatever 
is necessary to see the children participate in that activity. 
c. Plaintiff is ordered to provide defendant with 
a reasonable advance notice of any of the activities in which the 
children are involved and that there will be as much notice as 




are performing in a competitive activity or in which they are 
participating or performing in front of an audience that includes 
other adults or parents. 
d. Except for Christmas, defendant shall have 
the right to have the children on alternate holidays, and when 
those holidays are Monday holidays which come on the weekend 
defendant has visitation, he shall have the full weekend for 
three days including Monday, and on those weekends visitation 
shall be from Friday at 6:00 p.m. until Monday at 6:00 p.m. 
e. Each Christmas holiday, defendant shall have 
the right to have the children commencing on Christmas Day at 
1:00 p.m. for the remainder of the Christmas vacation until the 
commencement of school, unless there are less than five days of 
Christmas vacation before Christmas, in which event the parties 
agree time will be worked out so that pLaintiff has the children 
with her at least five days during the Christmas break. 
f. Defendant will have the right to have the 
children with him each summer for a month. During summer visitati 
while the children are in town, plaintiff will have the right to 
contact the children by telephone and they will have the right to 
contact her by telephone, and plaintiff shall be entitled to 
have one visit with them during that time. 
The visitation each summer will be agreed upon 
between the parties. Commencing in 1986 defendant shall notify 
A-31 
plaintiff at least 60 days in advance of when he would like to have 
the month of visitation, and at the same time, the parties will reach 
an agreement as to the one day during the month of summer visitation 
that plaintiff will have the right to visit. 
The parties are ordered to consult with each 
other at least 90 days before the beginning of the summer of 
their anticipated schedules to be sure there are no conflicts and 
to try and resolve potential conflicts that might exist. If 
there is a conflict as to when defendant's summer visitation 
should occur, either party will have the right to ask the Court 
to resolve the conflict if they are not able to do so. 
If the children are offered an opportunity to 
register for a summer activity that requires an early 
registration, plaintiff is ordered to notify defendant so that he 
can let plaintiff know whether this might conflict with his plans 
in the hope of avoiding a conflict. 
g. Defendant will have the right to visit with 
the children frequently at times other than those outlined 
provided the visitation does not conflict with important 
activities in which the children are involved. 
h. Either defendant or his present wife shall 
have the right to pick up and return the children. In the event 
defendant's current wife is picking up the children, she will 




visitation and will be taking the children out of town* defendan 
is ordered to provide plaintiff an itinerary so that she will 
know where the children are. Plaintiff is ordered whenever she 
takes the children out of town, to provide defendant with an 
itinerary so that he will know where the children are. 
7. Defendant is ordered to pay the sum of $1,500 
toward plaintiff's attorney's fees which shall be paid by 
defendant within 30 days of billing by plaintiff's attorney. 
DATED this / day of 2>?&^y, 1985. 
BY T 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HJNDLEY 
Clork Dis#fri6t Judge 
f*B$L?»<5 CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 30th day of April, 1985, 
I mailed a copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusic 
of Law to: 
David A. McPhie 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
147 North 200 West 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
r~7. £ /ci,(L>\< 7 2£L 
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B. L. DART (818) 
Attorney for Defendant 
310 South Main 
Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 521-6383 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
CAROL ANN BARKER BROWN, : 
Plaintiff, : ORDER 
v. : 
BRYANT JEROME BROWN, : Civil No. D79-3802 
Defendant. : Judge Sawaya 
oooOooo 
Defendant's Motion for an Order enforcing the 
provisions of an agreement entered into between the parties 
on the 5th of June, 1984, came on regularly for hearing on 
Monday, the 15th day of April, 1985, at the hour of 2:00 o'clock 
p.m. Defendant appearing in person and by his attorney B. L. 
Dart, and plaintiff appearing in person and by her attorney 
David A. McPhie, and the Court having heard the arguments and 
proffers of respective attorneys and having reviewed the file 
and having made and entered it's Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, now therefore, 
r ""-••*•* /»> —• 
(3dt La:- • Zr - ,. < 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Defendant's Motion for an Order appproving and 
enforcing the settlement agreement is hereby granted. 
2. The Stipulation of the parties is accepted by the 
Court and the Decree of Divorce heretofore entered in this action 
is hereby stipulated in accordance with that Stipulation as more 
fully hereinafter set forth. 
3. The Decree of Divorce is modified to provide that 
plaintiff's award of alimony shall be reduced from the amount of 
$900 a month to the amount of $500 a month commencing with the 
month of July, 1984, and continuing thereafter for a period of 
two years or until plaintiff remarries whichever occurs first. 
Upon the happening of either event, alimony will terminate. 
Defendant's payment of alimony shall be due on or before the 5th 
day of each month. 
So long as defendant has an obligation for alimony, 
he is ordered to maintain plaintiff as a named insured on a 
currently existing life insurance policy in the face amount of 
$50,000. Defendant is ordered to provide plaintiff with evidence 
that this life insurance is currently in force. 
4. The Decree of Divorce is modified to provide that 
defendant's obligation to plaintiff for support shall be 
increased from a sum of $300 per month to a sum of $500 per month 




commencing with the month of July, 1984. Payments of support are 
due on or before the 5th day of each month and defendant's 
obligation for support shall continue to age 21 for any child who 
shall elect to serve a mission for the LDS Church, or shall 
elect to attend a college or university. For any such child over 
the age of 18 not living at home, the payment of support shall be 
paid by defendant directly to said child. If payment of support 
is not paid to said child by defendant, plaintiff shall retain 
the right for enforcement of collection. 
As an additional obligation of support, defendant 
is ordered to pay for orthodontia treatment which has been 
provided to this time by Dr. Gary Stephens and to pay for any 
orthodontia and dentist expenses for any child so long as there 
is an obligation for the payment of support for said child. 
Defendant is further ordered to continue to maintain the children 
on his health and accident insurance which has a $100 per child 
deductible. Plaintiff is ordered to provide to defendant all 
medical, dental and orthodontia bills within a reasonable amount 
of time not to exceed 30 days of when they are received. Any 
medical expenses not described or covered by insurance will be 
the responsibility of plaintiff. 
As a further obligation for support, defendant is 




insurance with the children named thereon as beneficiaries so 
long as defendant has an obligation for support* This life 
insurance policy has a $50,000 death benefit. So long as the 
life insurance policy is in force, if defendant's obligation to 
pay support for any child terminates, plaintiff will have the 
right to notify defendant of her desire to elect that the policy 
have the name or names of the non-supported child or children 
removed from the policy so that it retains only the supported 
children as named beneficiaries. Unless such an election is made 
by plaintiff, defendant shall retain all children as named 
beneficiaries on the life insurance policy until his obligation 
to support the last child is terminated. 
5. Plaintiff is ordered to provide to defendant the 
account numbers of the Jordan Credit Union, Valley Bank/Olympus 
Branch, and Draper Bank accounts that are the accounts for the 
children awarded in the Decree of Divorce to be transferred to 
plaintiff. Upon receipt of these account numbers, defendant is 
ordered to take whatever steps are necessary to have his name 
removed from the accounts so that plaintiff's name can be placed 
upon the accounts. 
6. The Decree of Divorce is hereby modified to 
provide, in addition to what other rights of visitation the 




a. Defendant shall have the right to have the 
children with him on alternate weekends from Friday evening at 
6:00 p.m. to Saturday evening at 6:00 p.m. 
b. Plaintiff is ordered not to schedule any 
activities for the children which will in any way conflict with 
defendant's visitation time without first consulting with 
defendant and in the event the parties are not able to agree on 
such an activity being scheduled for defendant's visitation time, 
then either party will have the right to bring the matter before 
the Court for determination. In the event activities are 
scheduled as agreed upon or determined by the Court during 
defendant's visitation time, defendant is ordered to do whatever 
is necessary to see the children participate in that activity. 
c. Plaintiff is ordered to provide defendant with 
a reasonable advance notice of any of the activities in which the 
children are involved and that there will be as much notice as 
possible of any of the activities of the children in which they 
are performing in a competitive activity or in which they are 
participating or performing in front of an audience that includes 
other adults or parents. 
d. Except for Christmas, defendant shall have 
the right to have the children on alternate holidays, and when 
those holidays are Monday holidays which come on the weekend 




three days including Monday, and on those weekends visitation 
shall be from Friday at 6:00 p.m. until Monday at 6:00 p,m. 
e. Each Christmas holiday, defendant shall have 
the right to have the children commencing on Christmas Day at 
1:00 p.m. for the remainder of the Christmas vacation until the 
commencement of school, unless there are less than five days of 
Christmas vacation before Christmas, in which event the parties 
agree time will be worked out so that plaintiff has the children 
with her at least five days during the Christmas break. 
f. Defendant will have the right to have the 
children with him each summer for a month. During summer visitati 
while the children are in town, plaintiff will have the right to 
contact the children by telephone and they will have the right to 
contact her by telephone, and plaintiff shall be entitled to 
have one visit with them during that time. 
The visitation each summer will be agreed upon 
between the parties. Commencing in 1986 defendant shall notify 
plaintiff at least 60 days in advance of when he would like to hav 
the month of visitation, and at the same time, the parties will re 
an agreement as to the one day during the month of summer visitati 
that plaintiff will have the right to visit. 
The parties are ordered to consult with each 




their anticipated schedules to be sure there are no conflicts and 
to try and resolve potential conflicts that might exist. If 
there is a conflict as to when defendant's summer visitation 
should occur, either party will have the right to ask the Court 
to resolve the conflict if they are not able to do so. 
If the children are offered an opportunity to 
register for a summer activity that requires an early 
registration, plaintiff is ordered to notify defendant so that he 
can let plaintiff know whether this might conflict with his plans 
in the hope of avoiding a conflict. 
g. Defendant will have the right to visit with 
the children frequently at times other than those outlined 
provided the visitation does not conflict with important 
activities in which the children are involved. 
h. Either defendant or his present wife shall 
have the right to pick up and return the children. In the event 
defendant's current wife is picking up the children, she will 
honk for the children in the driveway. If the children do not 
come or she is not notified when the children will be there, then 
after waiting five minutes, she will have the right to go to the 
door to get that information. 
i. At any time defendant is exercising 
visitation and will be taking the children out of town, defendant 
is ordered to provide plaintiff an itinerary so that she will 
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know where the children are. Plaintiff is ordered whenever she 
takes the children out of town, to provide defendant with an 
itinerary so that he will know where the children are. 
7. Defendant is ordered to pay the sum of $15500 
toward plaintiff's attorney's fees which shall be paid by 
defendant within 30 days of billing by plaintiff's attorney. 
DATED this / ~ day of Jp^t^/^, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
Clerk 
• g \ — ^ , D i s ^ c t J"d8e 
MAILMHf&frlFICATE 
I hereby c e r t i f y tha t on the 30th day of Apr i l , 1985, 
I mailed a copy of the foregoing Order to : 
David A. McPhie 
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f 
147 North 200 West 
Sa l t Lake Ci ty , (JT 84103 
i .-




AFFLECK & MCPHIE 
ATTORNEYS & COUNSELORS 
AT LAW 
DAVID AFFLECK McPHIE 147 North 200 West 
of counsel Salt Lake City, Utah ftfJOJ 
GORDON BURT AFFLECK (301} 531-5333 
November 30, 1984 
Bert L. Dart 
10 Broadway B l d g . #430 
S a l t Lake C i t y , OT 84101 
R e : Brown v s . Brown - P e t i t i o n t o 
Modify C i v i l No. D79-3802 
Dear B e r t : 
Mrs. Brown has contacted me, and retained me for purposes 
of representing her in this matter. She has recieved your Notice 
to Appoint Counsel, and you111 find enclosed with this letter 
a copy of my Entry of Appearance. 
I have been informed that you're anxious to set a hearing, 
at which time the deposition taken on June 5th will be argued 
by you to be a binding stipulation. Please send me your motion 
and notice of hearing thereon, and we will gladly appear. 
I have noticed in going over some of the documents supplied 
by Mr. Liapis that we do not have Dr. Brown's 1983 tax return 
which was requested by Mr. Liapis prior to withdrawing. Please 
send me copies of that tax return at your earliest convenience. 
I can see that a substantial amount of discovery has already 
been done in this case, and I will not attempt to do any new 
discovery that I don't feel is absolutely necessary. I know 
that your client must be anxious to resolve this matter now, 
I know mine is. If I discover an area in which I think further 
discovery is necessary, I hope to be able to contact you 





November 30f 1984 
procedures. In this way we can shorten the time it takes to 
get a trial setting in this matter. 
Very truly yours, 
AFFLECK & McPHIE 
David A. McPhie 
DAM:ke 






























IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * rp 
CAROL ANN BARKER BROWN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRYANT JEROME BROWN, 
Defendant. 
Case No. D 79-3802 
! 
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
DAVID A. McPHIE, Attorney at Law, Affleck and McPhie, 
147 North Second West, Salt Lake City, Utah 
appearing on behalf of the plaintiff. 
BERT L. DART, Attorney at Law, 310 South Main Street, 
Salt Ldfce City, Utah 84101 
appearing on behalf of the defendant. 
84103 
#1330, 
Proceedings before the Honorable 
Judqe James S. Sawaya 
•
C/L£n IA, ^. r>'< April 15, 1985 
J
^ 8 K,. 
CATHY GALLEGOS 
Official Court Reporter 
cense No. 177 •^-^L^v //-^> , 'i " L l c 
^O^fZj^A^ East 400 South 
'hoin&&3f3 Courts Building 
' .al t Lake City, Utah 84111 
ifefefc^ V d4o<5^\^ \ ^ 23S 
1 BE IT REMEMBERED that on this the 15th day of 
2 April, 19 85, the above-entitled and numbered cause came on 
3 for hearing before said Honorable Court, Honorable James S. 
4 Sawaya, Judge presiding, in Salt Lake City, Utah, County of 
5 Salt Lake, whereupon the following proceedings were had, 
6 to wit: 
7 
8 THE COURT: Back to number one, Carol Ann Barker 
9 Brown versus Bryant Jerome Brown, defendant's motion for 
10 order approving and enforcing a settlement agreement. 
11 Mr. Dart, you appear for the defendant? 
12 MR. DART: This is the defendant's motion. I am 
13 representing the defendant and making the motion. Has the 
14 Court had an opportunity to read the motion and affidavit 
15 in support thereof? 
16 THE COURT: I have to confess I haven't. 
17 MR. DART: I will lay out the facts very quickly. 
18 THE COURT: David McPhie appears for the 
19 plaintiff, and do you want this reported, counsel? 
20 MR. DART: I don't think a record is necessary. 
21 MR. McPHIE: It may be necessary to have it 
22 reported. 
23 MR. DART: Your Honor, the facts are that Mr. and 
24 Mrs. Brown were formerly married to each other and were 
25 divorced under the terms of the decree of divorce, which 
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1 gave to Mrs. Brown custody of three children, provided her 
2 support, alimony and visitation rights- And in February of 
3 '83, over two years ago, Paul Liapis representing her, 
4 filed a modification asking for an increase in alimony and 
5 child support. On behalf of Mr. Brown, I filed a counter-
6 petition asking for an elimination of alimony and for 
7 modification of visitation rights. Through a year and 
8 quarter's time frame, we engaged in substantial discovery 
9 in the form of interrogatories, interrogatory answers. I 
10 had noticed the deposition of the plaintiff on the 5th of 
11 June and Paul Liapis had filed a request for trial setting. 
12 We were dealing against I think an August 12 trial date last 
13 summer. Mr. Liapis and I exchanged letters on that 
14 settlement. There were several letters that came back and 
15 forth. On the day before the deposition, which was set for 
16 June 5th, Paul called me and said, "We are settled. Why 
17 don't we utilize the deposition time to make an agreement. 
18 That agreement will then be put into a written form to 
19 conform with an order." On the 5th of June the court 
20 reporter, all parties being present, related that we were 
21 there to set down the agreement that we had reached and did 
22 so. The agreement effectively put a terminus point on 
23 alimony. However, it also reduced alimony, however, 
24 increased support. Instead of paying eighteen hundred 
25 dollars a month, nine hundred dollars alimony and nine 
A-46 <C'*KJ 
1 hundred dollars support, the doctor's obligation, defendant's 
2 obligation would be increased to a two thousand dollar 
3 figure, two hundred dollars a month increase by stepping 
4 up child support five hundred for a total of fifteen 
5 hundred in the form of support, five hundred for alimony-
6 There is also a comprehensive agreement with 
7 regards to visitation, what circumstances, holidays, I 
8 prepared a stipulation based upon that transcript. There's 
9 no question what the stipulation accurately reflected the 
10 agreement of the parties. I sent it to Paul Liapis. We 
11 had some problems in September I talked to him about> The 
12 stipulation was not signed. He said he would get it signed. 
13 He sent a letter to his client at that time. In the mean-
14 time in July it took effect. He started making the 
15 increased payments of two hundred dollars a month, now, 
16 ten months paid of two hundred more a month, a total of 
17 two thousand dollars more than he's paid above what the 
18 original order was based upon the stipulation, which amounts 
19 have been received by the plaintiff without objection. 
20 In addition, the trial date for August was 
21 I stricken. I think the Court would find a letter from myself 
22 | indicating the case had been settled. In November, I wrote 
23 I to Paul again saying, "I need a stipulation so we can close 
24 I this file out." Next thing I received from Paul Liapis was 
25 a withdrawal. Then the next thing I received was 
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1 communication from Mr. McPhie indicating that he was 
2 representing the plaintiff in this action and he wanted to 
3 continue with discovery, and I inferred from that he did 
4 not at that time—the plaintiff did not at that time accept 
5 the stipulation. We were five months from the day we sat 
6 down and agreed, three or four months from the date that a 
7 written stipulation had been presented, with no objection 
8 being made, no indication that the stipulation wasn't 
9 acceptable, with summer visitation based upon the stipula-
10 tion and with the payments, as I say, having been made by 
11 Mr. Brown having the effect of the two thousand dollar 
12 increase in the amount paid over what he was ordered to 
13 under the original order, but also a reduction in the amount 
14 that constituted alimony. So for this past ten months, he's 
15 been paying three hundred dollars a month less alimony that 
16 he cannot take as a deduction for his taxes. The short and 
17 tall of it is the agreement is not—does not claim to be 
18 unconscionable, does not claim to be contrary to what was 
19 discussed and presented in the presence of the plaintiff, 
20 Therefs only the claim that she doesn't want to at this 
21 time. Her conduct, sitting on it the last ten months, 
22 accepting the benefits of it, should be basis for estoppel. 
23 She should be bound by it. The Court should enter an order. 
24 THE COURT: Mr. McPhie. 
25 MR. McPHIE: Thank you. Mr. Dart's representations 
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1 of the facts essentially are accurate. As Ear as his 
2 recitation of facts went, this was commenced a couple years 
3 ago. There has been extensive discovery, Mr, Liapis did 
4 formerly represent Mrs. Brown. There was a trial date set 
5 in the summer of '84, I believe. And prior to that, there 
6 were in the spring of '84 negotiations for settlement, 
7 offers being sent back and forth* There was a deposition 
8 for Mrs. Brown scheduled by Mr. Dart and I have no reason 
9 to disbelieve Mr. Dart's assertion that Mr. Liapis called 
10 him prior to the day the deposition was set for, which was 
11 June 5 of f84, indicating that he believed there was a 
12 settlement and that Mr. Dart expected that when Mr. Liapis 
13 and his client came to that deposition, they would be 
14 stipulating. That's where the facts diverge, however. Mrs, 
15 Brown would testify—she has an affidavit in the file to 
16 the effect that although they were discussing settlement 
17 offers being made by Mr. Dart and they were responding to 
18 them with counteroffers and they were going back and forth, 
19 she was always being assured by Mr. Liapis that the things 
20 that she had asked for in her original petition in the way 
21 of increases in support were justified. This was the basis 
22 for her retaining him at the outset and that was her 
23 position throughout, including the spring of •84 when they 
24 were discussing the possible settlements that were being 
25 discussed back and forth. 
6 
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1 Her further testimony would be lhat on the actual 
2 day of the deposition, June 5th, '84, at his office, being 
3 Mr. Dart's office, Mrs. Brown learned for the first time 
4 that her former counsel essentially no longer believed that 
5 she would come out as he had led her to believe throughout 
6 the entire period, that he not only had received the 
7 settlement offers from Mr. Dart but that he believed that 
8 she should accept them. This is t h e — I suppose the 
9 disconcerting item to her is it was that day that she first 
10 learned or came to understand that he not only was reciting 
11 to her what they were offering. He had changed his 
12 position and felt that she should accept it and she did not 
13 understand that until up to that time and was very dismayed 
14 about it, felt that she was being put in the position of 
15 "If you agree to this, you can avoid having your deposition 
16 taken." 
17 Now, you and I would not fear having our deposition 
18 taken. Mrs. Brown had not, I believe, had her deposition 
19 ever taken before, was afraid of it, did not understand what 
20 it exactly entailed, apparently, and in the face of having 
21 spent a lot of time with Mr. Liapis, acquiescing somewhat 
22 in the face of authority figure to her, being very dismayed, 
23 being very confused, not knowing what to do, then proceeded 
24 into a room where this deposition was reported. It is ten 
25 pages in length. I have read it carefully. Mr. Dart 
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1 speaks on the record. The defendant, Mr. Brown, speaks on 
2 the record. Paul Liapis speaks on the record. Never does 
3 Carol Brown, my client, speak on the record. Her testimony 
4 would be that she did not understand the agreement. She 
5 wasn't in agreement with it. She felt bushwhacked and 
6 ambushed on the day of the deposition. She, for the first 
7 time, had her attorney advising her that she had to do it 
8 under the pain of having her deposition taking, which she 
9 didn't understand and she was not in agreement with it and 
10 said nothing about it on the record. 
11 Mr. Dart argues that my client has taken the 
12 benefit of the two hundred dollar increase for ten months 
13 now and acquiesced and benefited from the stipulation v/hile 
14 she seeks to get out of it. The facts surrounding that are 
15 simply this: Mrs. Brown would testify that after having 
16 left Mr. Dart's office, it was her understanding that Mr. 
17 Liapis would be preparing a stipulation, turns out that it 
18 was agreed that Mr. Dart would prepare it. Mr. Dart sent a 
19 written stipulation, which I have also read and which does 
20 fairly reflect that which was taken down at the deposition, 
21 to Mr. Liapis and asked him to have his client sign it. 
22 Mrs. Brown was not contacted by Mr. Liapis until tv/o and a 
23 half months after the deposition—was the first time she was 
24 ever notified that he had produced a written document of 




1 sign it. When she got notice that he had it, it was because 
2 he sent her a letter with the copy which she immediately 
3 read and was dismayed to see what it said and tried to make 
4 an appointment to see Mr. Liapis to discuss it. Ker 
5 testimony would further be for the first time she tried to 
6 get in to discuss it she was told she wouldn't get an 
7 appointment for three weeks. The next time she went—she 
8 went to go to the appointment three weeks later, she was 
9 told when she got there that they had been trying to get 
10 ahold of her not to come because Mr. Liapis was out of town. 
11 There was approximately another month or more delays in 
12 getting together with Mr. Liapis. So you are now three and 
13 a half months from the deposition date when she finally got 
14 to him with a written copy and discussed it and said she 
15 felt the terms were very unfair and unreasonable. I will 
16 indicate to the Court in a moment what the terms are—is 
17 when the dispute arose between them. She would not sign. 
18 He did not want to continue to represent her. 
19 THE COURT: Wasn't she present when the terms of 
20 the stipulation were stated for the record? 
21 MR. McPHIE: She was. 
22 THE COURT: Did she recant or object at that time? 
23 MR. McPHIE: She said nothing. 
24 THE COURT: Well, I suppose what we ought to d o — 
25 why not? Did she feel intimidated to the point she felt 
9 
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1 she could not object at that time? 
2 MR. McPHIE: I believe she dido Then is when 
3 Mr. Liapis withdrew as counsel and that was the first 
4 notice that Mr. Dart had really that the stipulation would 
5 never be signed, but you are now talking four months since 
6 the stipulation was entered into on the record, and in 
7 fairness to Mr. Dart, he didn't know for four months- He 
8 k n e w — I should say he had reason to suspect when he didn't 
9 get a signed stipulation from counsel. Since that time it 
10 is true she's taken the additional two hundred dollars and 
11 frankly she's asked if she should continue to take that, 
12 and that's eighteen hundred dollars moved up to two thousand 
13 dollars, and she may have been advised to hang on to that 
14 money because the result of this was not yet clear. We 
15 filed a request for additional discovery. Obviously, Mr. 
16 Dart then discovered that certainly we were not intending 
17 to sign the stipulation and he made this motion to confirm 
18 the stipulation which was previously taken on June 5th, as 
19 per order of the Court. 
20 We seek now to avoid that, after two years time 
i 
21 and many many thousands of dollars on both sides and being J 
22 nearly ready for trial to simply try the case, and there1s i 
23 a case, Your Honor, cited by the Utah Supreme Court in 1975—j 
24 Mr. Dart already has a copy and, in fact, nay have a copy 





























a copy of this case when it was argued before the 
Commissioner—it's a divorce case. The facts are not 
exactly the same but the Supreme Court of the State managed 
to articulate, in Kline, a number of points of law 
surrounding stipulations, especially in domestic cases. I 
think that some of the things that are pointed out in the 
Kline case are the differences between stipulation of facts 
and stipulations to outcome in a domestic case, which is 
essentially equitable in its nature. The difference between 
whether you should let a person out of a stipulation in a 
domestic matter based on reasonable reliance of the party 
who has relied on the stipulation and timeliness. It makes 
distinctions in terms of whether the Court thinks that a 
stipulation is fair. One of the things that I discover in 
this work of domestic work, the Court is not bound by the 
stipulation in domestic cases. He can take them as advisory, 
can enter different rulings. We see that where a wife 
wants to take too little child support or where parties want 
to have joint custody of the children and the Court simply 
won't approve. 
Let me just address those for a second. This is 
a stipulation totally with regard to outcome, not a single 
fact is stipulated to. There was no information in this 
about the income of Dr. Brown, whether it did increase or 
whether it didn't increase. With regard to him having relied 
11 
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1 to his detriment, it is true he has paid according to the 
2 stipulation that was entered into ever since July of 1984, 
3 but he's known since some time in the late fall of '84 that 
4 that was not accepted by Mrs- Brown, yet he's chosen to 
5 continue it. Why? Well, he would like to be able to argue 
6 day past conduct and in the course of dealing and itfs an 
7 insignificant amount to Dr. Brown. It's eighteen hundred 
8 dollars moved up to two thousand dollars. Mr. Dart has 
9 explained the terms of the stipulation. Mr. Brown formerly 
10 had in the divorce decree nine hundred dollars alimony, 
11 nine hundred dollars child support. The stipulation provides 
12 that her alimony decrease immediately four hundred dollars 
13 and drop off completely to zero in another two years* But 
14 it does provide for an increase of two hundred dollars per 
15 child in child support. Child support goes up six and 
16 alimony goes down four, and she ends up with two hundred 
17 dollars a month increase but in two years she ends up with 
18 a four hundred dollars a month decrease. If thatfs a good 
19 outcome for Mrs. Brown, in the face of the discovery that 
20 was already in the file when the stipulation was taken or 
21 recorded, I don't know what a bad outcome would be. 
22 The documentary evidence is that Dr. Brown's 
23 income has gone somewhere between fifty and sixty thousand 
24 dollars at the time of the decree to up between ninety and 
25 a hundred thousand dollars at present. That's not including 
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1 money he pays into a pension and profit-sharing plan that 
2 would kick it up over a hundred thousand dollars. If she 
3 came out behind it wasn't a good deal. I don't think this 
4 is binding in the case of equity upon this Court. 
5 With regard to the argument that she wasn't 
6 timely, it was four months before she could even get 
7 together with Mr. Liapis and find out what the stipulation 
8 that had been sent to her was. She knew as soon as he with-
9 drew, which was as soon as she could talk to him, that she 
10 didn't want to be bound by that, that she didn't agree to 
11 it. She thought she had been bushwhacked and if they sent 
12 the money, additional monies, the Kline case clearly states 
13 it is within the discretion of the Court to relieve either 
14 of the parties of a domestic matter where just cause exists. 
15 I don't think he's relied to his detriment, certainly an 
16 adjustment can be made at the time of trial. It's not hard 
17 to make an adjustment if this case is tried that will make 
18 up to the two hundred dollars a month he has sent by simply 
19 reducing it, will reduce in his favor. We think he will be 
20 obligated to pay more. She was timely within her power to 
21 be timely. I think that it's unfair because if in the face 
22 of a massive increase by Dr. Brown gives her less money 
23 overall, that's the reverse of what she went to counsel for, 
24 not a good deal for her, not fundamentally fair. 




1 not in a domestic case where the parties are getting 
2 together for the purpose of stipulating to outcome, where 
3 this woman is going to get stuck with an agreement pre-made 
4 between her attorney which she never understood or agreed 
5 J to, now, you can say she was there and she heard., All I 
6 can say to you is having had many divorce clients try to 
7 recite back to me what they just agreed to in domestic 
8 matters and not having them even come close, I can tell you 
9 that it is very easy to misunderstand for a layman. It is 
10 very easy to misunderstand your attorney telling you what 
11 proposed offer and what your own attorney tells you what he j 
12 thinks you should accept. She didn't understand when you are! 
13 in a case where a great deal of discovery has been done, | 
14 there is almost nothing left to do and she simply should ; 
15 have the trial on the merits at this point. 
16 As a back-up position, let me argue this. The 
17 stipulation should have some value but it shouldn't have the 
18 value of her being held to it right now. Let them put it 
19 on at the time of trial, the evidence of what she was 






with the evidence that I would be able to present about 
Dr. Brown's income and if the Court takes the stipulation 
for what it is worth in comparison with all the other evi-
dence, I am not afraid of the outcome. But to simply order 





1 we have shown some just cause and/the Supremo Court said 
2 she could be believed from that, I think it simply is 
3 setting us up to have another petition to modify and putting 
4 her off for another period of time so that she can come 
5 back and claim some change of circumstances, We are too 
6 close to the final outcome to waste everything that's been 
7 done because of what was said in the stipulation. 
8 MR. DART: Very briefly, it needs to be kept in 
9 mind that the settlement was reached in circumstances where 
10 there was an August trial date, where there was a petition 
11 for termination of alimony at that time, where the plaintiff 
12 in this action has a college degree, had a teaching 
13 certificate at one time, has a real estate license, where 
14 the children at the time of the divorce were from three to 
15 nine—by the time of the trial last August would be between 
16 fourteen and eight and that the exposure of termination of 
17 alimony while she was receiving counsel with Paul Liapis 
18 bargained for a two-year alimony award and two hundred 
19 dollars step up, she came into the deposition afraid of the 
20 deposition and for the first time, in her language, that 
21 it completely amazed and bedazzled her, that it wasn't 
22 until she got the stipulation two months later, she didn't 
23 understand until then. We wrote a letter to Mr- Liapis 
24 I setting down all the issues and our position on all the 




1 May 10 talking about termination of alimony and a time 
2 frame concerning alimony and support, visitation rights. 
3 A copy of that letter was sent to Carol Brown on the 10th 
4 of May. Then sent another letter on the 30th of May with 
5 some final adjustments. Those letters were in the file and 
6 apparently in the possession of the plaintiff before the 
7 time of this deposition. If she was surprised at the time 
8 of the deposition, I think she had a duty to respond a 
9 little quicker than she did. She knew what had been said. 
10 She could have contacted her attorney and let her know of 
11 her reservation by phone, letter or some manner. She never 
12 did do that. My last letter to Paul was the 2nd of 
13 November saying, "Where are we on the stipulation?" It was 
14 only after that that I received his withdrawal. The Kline 
15 case does indicate—Mr. McPhie is correct this is an area 
16 where the Court has substantial discretion. It is within 
17 the Court's discretion to accept the stipulation and enforce 
18 it or set it aside. But in circumstances if this is not an 
19 unconscionable stipulation, there is a situation that is in 
20 the interest of justice that it be enforced unless there is 
21 a justification for avoiding it. As they say in the Kline 
22 case, if there's any justification in law or equity for 
23 avoiding or repudiating a stipulation and he timely does so, 
24 he's entitled to be relieved from it, otherwise not. Ue 




1 a word. We have had the loss of a trial date. Under the 
2 circumstances, there should be an estoppel. Thank you. 
3 THE COURT: Let me read this case. It is new to 
4 me. I will have you a ruling within a day or two. 
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